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Abstract
In computer science, robustness is the ability of a computer system to cope with errors during execution. Robust codes are
new nonlinear systematic error detecting codes that provide uniform protection against all errors, whereas classical linear error-
detection code detects only a certain class of errors. Therefore, defence by the linear codes can be ineﬀective in many channels
and environments, when error distribution is unknown. The probability of error masking can increase depending on codeword
distribution. However, mapping the most probable codewords to a predeﬁned set can reduce the maximum of the error masking
distribution.
The algorithm proposed in this paper is based on the second-order wavelet decomposition of B-splines under non-uniform nets.
In this paper, we propose a general approach to the algorithm construction of spline-wavelet decompositions of linear space over an
arbitrary ﬁeld. This approach is based on the generalization of calibration relations and functional systems, which are biorthogonal
to basic systems of relevant space. The obtained results permit the construction of second-order spline-wavelet robust code.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of The 2015 International Conference on Soft Computing and Software
Engineering (SCSE 2015).
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1. Introduction
Modern error injection techniques allow an adversary to attack cryptographic devices by inducing errors of any
multiplicity. The errors can be induced into every part of the codeword. One of the most eﬃcient countermeasures
against these attacks are error detecting codes. Error detecting codes are widely used for telecommunication channels.
They ensure the reliability and security of devices from soft and hard errors, and also side channel attacks. Side
channel attacks can be detected with relatively high probability by security-oriented codes. Security-oriented codes
are robust and partially robust codes. Currently, the problem of ﬁnding new constructions of robust and partially
robust codes is actual. Diﬀerent types of robust codes, partially robust codes, and minimum distance robust codes
were oﬀered in [2,3,6,8]. One disadvantage of robust codes is that these codes assume that the information bits are
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uniformly distributed and are not known to an attacker. In practice, however, there are codewords that are much more
likely to appear than others.
This article explores the robustness of code, that is derived from second-order spline-wavelet transforms. In this
paper we show that using a speciﬁc method of net selection and element discarding, the second-order spline-wavelet
reconstruction formula can be transformed to a coding function of robust code. The article examines the robust-
ness ability of second-order spline-wavelet code in case of non-uniform codeword distribution. Gray mapping most
probable codeword of proposed code to a predeﬁned set can be used to reduce the maximum of the error masking
probability.
2. Theory of the spline-wavelet decomposition
Piecewise functions (second-order splines) have been used in mathematics since Euler. Spline theory was devel-
oped in the middle of the XX-th century. The term spline was introduced in mathematics by Isaac Schoenberg (1946)
and splines were used for theoretical investigations until 1960. Since 1960, however, splines have also been used
for computer simulations in science, engineering and techniques. Wavelet is mathematical function used to divide a
given function or a continuous-time signal into diﬀerent components. Experiments of using wavelets decomposition
of splines on grids for simulations of information stream are provided [10,11].
Let Z be the set of all integers. On ﬁnite or inﬁnite interval (α, β) of the real axis R1 consider the net: X  {x j} j∈Z,
X : . . . < x−1 < x0 < x1 < . . . , (1.1)
for which α = lim
j→−∞ x j, β = limj→+∞ x j,∀ j ∈ Z. (1.2)
(The same result is valid for the ﬁnite net, enough to consider the trace of all objects in the interval embedded in
(α, β)). Segments [x j, x j+1] are called elementary net segments of the net X. Denote the linear space of functions that
are continuously diﬀerentiable in points of the open interval (α, β) as C1(α, β). On the net X, consider polynomial
second-order spline ω j ( j ∈ Z):
ω j(t) = (t − x j)2(x j+1 − x j)−1(x j+2 − x j)−1, for t ∈ [x j, x j+1); (1.3)
ω j(t) = (x j+2 − x j)−1(x j+2 − x j+1)−1(x j+3 − x j+1)−1 ×
[
(x j − x j+2 − x j+3 + x j+1) t2 − 2(x j+1x j − x j+2x j+3) t+
+x jx j+1x j+3 − x jx j+2x j+3 + x jx j+1x j+2 − x j+1x j+2x j+3
]
, for t ∈ [x j+1, x j+2); (1.4)
ω j(t) = (t − x j+3)2(x j+3 − x j+2)−1(x j+3 − x j+1)−1, for t ∈ [x j+2, x j+3], (1.5)
ω j(t) = 0 for t  [x j, x j+3], so supp ω j[x j, x j+3]. (1.6)
In the space C1(α, β) we consider the linear functionals g(i), i ∈ Z deﬁned by formula
〈g(i), u〉  u(xi+1) + (xi+2 − xi+1)u ′(xi+1)/2
∀u ∈ C1(α, β). (1.7)
For a ﬁxed k ∈ Z let
x j  x j for j ≤ k − 1, x j  x j+1 for j ≥ k, ξ  xk
and consider the new net X : . . . < x−1 < x0 < x1 < . . ..
Second-order splines ω j, based on the new net X, are represented by formulas (1.3) – (1.6) with replacement nodes
x j of the net X on the nodes x j of the net X. Obviously, for j  {k − 3, k − 2, k − 1}, splines ω j coincide with splines
discussed previously:
ω j(t) ≡ ω j(t),∀ j ≤ k − 4;ω j(t) ≡ ω j+1(t),∀ j ≥ k. (1.8)
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Consider the representation of spline ω j, j = k − 3, k − 2, k − 1 through the spline ωi, i = k − 3, k − 2, k − 1, k and
derive the reconstruction and decomposition formulas, allowing the representation of splines obtained on the new net
through splines constructed on the original net.
This article will present only formulas of reconstruction and decomposition without proofs; proofs of these formu-
las are represented in [9,10,11]. Assume that the coeﬃcients ai and bi′ of element projection decomposition u ∈ Ω(X)
on the spaces Ω(X) and W: Pu =
∑
i aiωi, Qu =
∑
i′ bi′ωi′ , where ai = 〈g(i), u〉, bi′ = 〈g(i′), Qu〉, ω(X) = ω(X) +Wk, is
the corresponding wavelet decomposition.
Theorem 1. For the second-order spline-wavelet decomposition of the space Ω(X), formulas of the reconstruction
are [10]:
c j = a j + b j for j ≤ k − 3,
ck−2 = ak−3(xk − ξ)(xk − xk−2)−1 + ak−2(ξ − xk−2)(xk − xk−2)−1 + bk−2,
ck−1 = ak−2(xk+1 − ξ)(xk+1 − xk−1)−1 + ak−1(ξ − xk−1)(xk+1 − xk−1)−1 + bk−1,
c j = a j−1 + b j for j ≥ k. (1.9)
Theorem 2. For the second-order spline-wavelet decomposition of the spaceΩ(X), formulas of the decomposition
are [10]:
ai = ci for i ≤ k − 3,
ak−2 = −(xk − ξ)(ξ − xk−2)−1ck−3 + (xk − xk−2)(ξ − xk−2)−1ck−2,
ai = ci+1 for i ≥ k − 1,
b j = 0 for j  k − 1,
bk−1 =
[
(xk+1 − ξ)(xk − ξ)ck−3 − (xk+1 − ξ)(xk − xk−2)ck−2 + (xk+1 − xk−1)(ξ − xk−2)ck−1 − (ξ − xk−1)(ξ − xk−2)ck
]
×
×(xk+1 − xk−1)−1(ξ − xk−2)−1.
3. The construction of the robust code based on the second-order spline-wavelet transformation
Mapping GF(2n) → GF(2) is called a boolean function of n variables. Each boolean function can be deﬁned
by algebraic normal form (ANF): f (u) = (
n⊕
k=1
⊕
i1,...,ik
ai1,...,ik ui1 · ... · uik ). For each k, indexes i1, ..., ik ares diﬀerent and
together run all k - subset elements of set {1, ..., n}. The coeﬃcients ai1,...,ik , a0 take values 0 or 1.
Nf is called a nonlinearity of a boolean function. Nonlinearity Nf of an arbitrary function f is closely related to its
Walsh-Hadamar coeﬃcient [5]:
Nf = 2n−1 − 12 maxν∈Zn2 |Wf (ν)|
Then smaller the maximum of the module Wf (ν), the higher nonlinearity of the function f . A Bent function is a
boolean function of n variables (n is even) such that the module of each Walsh-Hadamard coeﬃcient for this function
is equal to 2n/2.
Robust codes are new nonlinear systematic error detecting codes that provide uniform protection against all errors
without any (or which minimize) assumptions on the error and fault distributions, capabilities and methods of an
attacker.
One of the main criteria for evaluating the eﬀectiveness of a robust code is the error masking probability. The error
masking probability Q(e) can be deﬁned as [2]:
Q(e) =
|{x| ∈ C, x + e ∈ C}|
M
,
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whereC is the robust code, x is a codeword that belongs to the codeC, e is an error, and M is the number of codewords
in the code C.
Optimum robust code (n,M,R)q is robust code that has the maximum possible number of codewords M for a given n
and robustness R with respect to [5]:
M2 − M ≤ R(qn − 1) (2.1).
This section describes the algorithm for obtaining the robust code from the formulas of reconstruction of the
second-order splines. In the proposed code construction, the elements from the information part will not be discarded.
The elements of the additional (wavelet) ﬂow will be added to the codeword as a checking mechanism. Elements of
the presented code will be checked for being the result of the spline-wavelet transform bk−1. In view of the above, let
present formulas of reconstruction (1.9) to the next form:
bk−1 = [(xk+1 − ξ)(xk − ξ)ck−3 − (xk+1 − ξ)(xk − xk−2)ck−2 − (xk+1 − xk−1)(ξ − xk−2)ck−1 − (ξ − xk−1)(ξ − xk−2)ck]·
·(xk+1 − xk−1)(ξ − xk−2) (2.2)
where c = {c1, c2, ..., cN} is an original information ﬂow, b is an element of additional ﬂow, k is the number of elements
(or blocks) that is discarded from the original ﬂow and from the net.
x = {x1, x2, ..., xN−1} is a net with one discarded element: ξ = xk (x = {x1, x2, ..., xN)} is an original net.
Let the elements of the net depend on the current codeword and respectively equal:
xk−1 = ck−1; ξ = ck; xk−2 = ck−2; xk+1 = ck−3.
Then the expression (2.2) can be converted to the next boolean function:
f (ck−3, ck−2, ck−1, ck) = bk−1 = [(ck−3 ⊕ ck)(xk ⊕ ck)ck−3 ⊕ (ck−3 ⊕ ck)(xk ⊕ ck−2)ck−2 ⊕ (ck−3 ⊕ ck−1)(ck ⊕ ck−2)ck−1⊕
⊕(ck ⊕ ck−1)(ck ⊕ ck−2)ck](ck−3 ⊕ ck−1)(ck ⊕ ck−2) (2.3).
The resulting function (2.3) is the coding function of the code construction proposed in this article. Give the encoding
function (2.3) the algebraic normal form:
f = ckck−1 ⊕ ckck−3 ⊕ ck−1ck−3 ⊕ ck−2ck−3.
Theorem 3. Spline-wavelet code with encoding function f (ck−3, ck−2, ck−1, ck) = ckck−1 ⊕ ckck−3 ⊕ ck−1ck−3 ⊕ ck−2ck−3
is optimal robust code.
Proof. Code characteristics depend on the nonlinearity of the encoding function. Let c and l be the codewords
of spline-wavelet (n, k) code. Then the code consists of codewords (x, f (x)), where f is an encoding function
f (ck−3, ck−2, ck−1, ck) = ckck−1 ⊕ ckck−3 ⊕ ck−1ck−3 ⊕ ck−2ck−3, ck−3, ck−2, ck−1, ck ∈ GF(qn−k). This encoding func-
tion is a bent function. Error e = (e1, e2), where e1 ∈ GF(qk),e2 ∈ GF(qn−k) will not be detected if and only if
f (x + e1) = f (x) + e2, that is, when directional derivative f (x + e1) − f (x) = De1 will be equal to e2. Since the last
condition is feasible for a bent function, the code based on encoding function f is robust systematic code. Check code
for optimality:
2k(2k − 1) ≤ 2
k
2r
(2n − 2n−k) = 2n+k−r − 2k = 22k − 2k.
It is clear from inequality this that the code , which satisﬁes the bounds of (2.1), is an optimum code.
The proposed construction of the spline-wavelet code is (k+ r, 2k, 2k−r)2 optimal robust systematic code, where k is
the number of information elements, and r is the number of redundant elements. The maximum of the error masking
probabilities max Q(e) for uniform distribution of codewords is equal to 1/2.
4. Second-Order robust spline-wavelet code under non-uniform distribution of codewords
The general architecture of model used for protecting cryptosystems based on the use and analysis of second-order
spline-wavelet robust code is shown in Figure 1. The model architecture is based on adding redundancy around an
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Fig. 1. General architecture for protection of hardware with second-order spline-wavelet code
original device to create data redundancy which can be used to verify data integrity and the correct operation of the
cryptosystem.
The architecture is composed of three hardware components: original hardware, encoder of second-order spline-
wavelet code for predicting the redundancy bits of the original device and an check mechanism which veriﬁes the
predetermined relationship of the output of the original device and the result of the encoder work. By deﬁning an
appropriate code and implementing the suitable function in the Encoder a desired level of robustness can be guaranteed
for the desired output of the Original Cryptosystem.
Codes are usually constructed under the assumption that the codewords are equiprobable. However, this assumption
is almost always violated. In reality, the distribution of the codewords in a telecommunication channel are often non-
uniform. An adversary can control the outputs and inputs of the cryptosystem and can gather information about
distribution character. Subsequently, the attacker can use this information to choose an error that is diﬃcult to detect.
But using the mapping of most probable codewords to a predeﬁned set can decrease error masking probabilities of
certain robust code [4]. This section demonstrates using such mapping for spline-wavelet code.
Example 1. Provide an example of computing the error masking probability under non-uniform distribution. Take
the spline-wavelet code with the parameters n=5, k=4. The encoding function of the (5;4) robust spline-wavelet code
has the following form:
c5 = c1c2 ⊕ c1c3 ⊕ c1c4 ⊕ c3c4,
where c1, c2, c3, c4 are information bits, and c5 is a check bit.
Assume that we compute the error masking probability under a non-uniform distribution of the codewords. Let the
codewords {0, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15} occur with the high probability. The error 01000 has the maximum error masking
probability in that case. Use the Gray mapping to the most probable codewords {0, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15}:
00000(0)→ 00000(0); 00010(2)→ 00011(3);
00100(4)→ 00110(6); 00110(6)→ 00101(5);
01001(9)→ 01101(13); 01011(11)→ 01110(15);
01101(13)→ 01011(11); 01110(15)→ 01001(9).
After Gray mapping, max Q(e) reduces from 1 − e to 0.75(1 − e).
The construction of the robust code with Gray mapping was modelled on the computer. The implemented model
measured error masking probability for six diﬀerent probability distributions and diﬀerent predeﬁned sets. The results
of the model are presented in Table 1.
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Spline-wavelet code
parameters max Q(e) max QG(e)
n=5, k=4 0.73 0.62
n=10, k=8 0.68 0.61
n=20, k=16 0.80 0.67
Table 1. Comparison of the maximum error masking probability with Gray mapping and without it. n is length of the
code, k is number of information symbols in codewords.
As a result, using Grey mapping of the most probable codewords to a predeﬁned set reduces error masking prob-
abilities of the spline-wavelet code. Therefore, this mechanism can be used for improving the characteristics of the
presented robust spline-wavelet code in cases where the codewords are non-uniform.
5. Conclusion
The paper deals with the problem of security-oriented codes under non-uniform distribution. It is shown that if the
set of most probable codewords is small, then the probability that an error injection attack will be detected decreases.
The immunity of the cryptosystem against such attacks can be enhanced by robust codes.
In this paper, we have described an algorithm for obtaining robust code based on the spline-wavelet decomposition
of second-order splines. Detection error probability of the resulting second-order spline-wavelet robust code considers
the cases of non-uniform and uniform codeword distributions. In case a codeword has a non-uniform distribution, it is
proposed that Gray mapping be used to reduce the maximum of the error masking probability. The suggested method
improves the robustness of the proposed secong-order spline-wavelet code and avoid the worst case of error masking
probability without additional cost.
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